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Technology, “Machine Age” Warfare, and the Military 
Use of Dogs, 1880–1918

Gervase Phillips
On 10 May 1895, the Manchester Times reported the suffering of some members of the French expeditionary force then engaged in the final stages 
of the conquest of Madagascar:
The war dogs that have accompanied the French troops . . . are 
having a bad time of it. Numbers of the poor animals when on 
night duty fall prey to crocodiles and the poisonous serpents, while 
those that escape fall victims to fever and other illnesses. It is 
hoped that when troops get further into the interior, where there 
are fewer reptiles, the dogs will get on better than at present.1
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Abstract
Many military historians have emphasised technological innovation as 
the defining characteristic of modern “machine age” warfare. This par-
adigm ignores the central roles that animals have played in twentieth-
century wars and fails to recognise that the scale of their exploitation 
has actually escalated in modernity, largely in response to technologi-
cal innovation. In short, the military employment of animals on a mas-
sive scale is as much a defining characteristic of modern warfare as is 
mechanisation. Here, the example of the establishment of permanent, 
regular military dog units, for use in “civilised” warfare, from the 1880s 
onwards is used to illustrate this point.
1. “Interesting Facts,” Manchester Times, 10 May 1895, 5.
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In one sense, the presence of these unfortunate dogs with a European army, espe-
cially in this particular context, should not come as any surprise. The history of 
the war dog as an instrument of the conquest, and subsequent policing, of colo-
nial territories is a very long one. The Greek historian Zonarus wrote of how the 
Roman commander Marcus Pomponius, during the occupation of Sardinia in 231 
BCE, employed “keen-scented dogs from Italy” to track down those resisting his 
rule to their woodland and subterranean hiding places.2 Jean de Bethancourt, who 
conquered the Canary Isles for Castile in 1402 CE, also unleashed hunting dogs 
against the indigenous people, the Guanches.3 This practise became a feature of the 
pacification of the Canaries over the course of the next hundred years and possibly 
of the final stages of the Reconquista too, when, in 1492, the Moorish kingdom of 
Granada was finally conquered by Ferdinand and Isabella. It would travel to the 
New World in the ships of the conquistadors, as detailed in the appalled testimony 
of the Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484–1566).4 There is some 
suggestion, too, that the earl of Essex may have included mastiffs in the English 
forces he led to Ireland in 1598.5 In the Americas, the use of dogs for military pur-
poses became a characteristic and recurrent feature of colonial and racial conflict. 
Historians John Campbell and Sara E. Johnson have graphically chronicled how 
their employment became common practice in warfare against both indigenous 
populations and rebellious enslaved Africans and their descendants for over 300 
years. In the event of insurrection, or during assaults on isolated maroon colonies 
(communities of runaways, established in remote areas such as the highlands of 
Jamaica or the Everglades of Florida), the bloodhound became a savage and effec-
tive weapon of white racial hegemony. The Cuban bloodhound, in particular, was 
widely exported to slave-holding regimes across the Americas and was employed 
by the French during the Haitian Revolution (1791–1803), by the British in the 
Second Maroon War in Jamaica (1795–1796), and by the Americans during the 
Second Seminole War in Florida (1835–1842).6 The service of those dogs with the 
2. Quoted in Stephen L. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (Princeton, N.J.: Princ-
eton University Press, 1985), 250. For a very full survey of the military use of dogs up to the 
nineteenth century, see David Karunanithy, Dogs of War: Canine Use in Warfare from Ancient 
Egypt to the 19th Century (London: Yarack Publishing, 2008).
3. Pierre Bontier and Jean Le Verrier, The Canarian or the Conquest and Conversion of the 
Canary Islands by Messire Jean de Bethancouurt, ed. and trans. Richard Henry Major (London: 
Hakluyt Society, 1872), 149–50.
4. Bartolomé de Las Casas, The Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account, trans. Herma Brif-
fault (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 127.
5. Letter, 29 April 1598, Giles Van Harwick [alias of William Resould] to Peter Artson 
[alias of Robert Cecil], in Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Elizabeth, 1598–1601, ed. Mary 
Anne Everett Green (London, 1869), 43. 
6. John Campbell, “The Seminoles, the ‘Bloodhound War’ and Abolitionism, 1796–1865,” 
Journal of Southern History 72 (2006): 259–302; Sara E. Johnson, “‘You Should Give them Blacks 
to Eat’: Waging Inter-American Wars of Torture and Terror,” American Quarterly 61 (2009): 
65–92. 
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French army in Madagascar in 1895 might, thus, be seen as a mere manifestation 
of an established, if under-acknowledged, tradition in European warfare.
Yet it is remarkable in another sense. The presence of dogs in an expeditionary 
force of the 1890s seems particularly striking as it occurred at a point when 
technological innovation was, it is often assumed, transforming the conduct of 
war. “Muscle,” it has been asserted, was giving way to “machine.” Tactically, the 
firepower of magazine-fed, bolt-action rifles, automatic machine-guns, and quick-
firing (QF) artillery gave rise to the “empty battlefield” (not actually “empty,” of 
course, but where units were dispersed, in cover or entrenched). Operationally, the 
railways gave modern armies unprecedented mobility and an unheralded capacity 
for sustaining logistical support of forces in the field. The telegraph, and latterly 
the telephone, transformed the reliability, speed, and reach of communications 
available to commanders and the polities they served. Strategically, the modern 
industrial state proved capable of mobilising its population and its economic 
resources to a remarkable degree and thus of deploying mass conscript armies, 
paying them, equipping them, and feeding them not just for a campaigning season, 
but for conflicts that stretched over years. The pace of technological change seemed 
only to accelerate as the military possibilities of the internal combustion engine 
and powered flight were grasped, not to mention the yet darker potentialities 
offered by the chemical and biological sciences. 
Given the significance of these developments, it is hardly surprising that many 
commentators on military affairs have consistently sought to define this age by 
its technologically innovative characteristics. Those who lived (and campaigned) 
through the wars of the new epoch were the most apt to stress the impact of 
recent inventions on the conduct of war. Thus, in 1920, J. F. C. Fuller would predict 
that “the doom of all muscular warfare has been sealed.”7 Later generations of 
military historians, if rather less emphatic on that precise point, have nevertheless 
emphasised what they understood as the same broad trend. In 1986, Michael 
Geyer argued that the “true” conception of modern war was shaped by technology, 
machines being substituted for men.8 For Trevor Dupuy, invention, in the fields of 
“metallurgy, chemistry, ballistics and electronics . . . mechanics and engineering,” 
was key to understanding war in “the age of technological change.”9
Naturally, this paradigm has not gone unchallenged. In the 1990s, historians 
of “machine age” warfare, such as Paddy Griffith, Hew Strachan, and J. P. Harris, 
pointed both to the continued importance of human qualities (of command, morale, 
and discipline) on the battlefield and to the practical limitations of nascent technical 
innovations in combat. Noted, too, were the frequent failures of technologically 
7. J. F. C. Fuller, “Tanks and Cavalry Tactics,” Cavalry Journal [U.K.] 10 (1920): 527.
8. Michael Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945,” in Mak-
ers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1986), 527–97.  
9. Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (New York: Da Capo, 1984), 
169.
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10. Paddy Griffith, Forward into Battle (Novato, Calif.: Presido Press, 1992), 136–72; J. P. 
Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 316; Hew Stra-
chan, “The Morale of the German Army, 1917–1918,” in Facing Armageddon, ed. Hugh Cecil and 
Peter H. Liddle (London: Leo Cooper, 1996), 383–98. 
11. Andrew Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolution,” Na-
tional Interest 37 (1994): 30–42.
12. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 
1300–2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
13. Jeremy Black, War and Technology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Co-
lin Grey, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: 
Frank Cass, 2002); Brice Harris, America, Technology and Strategic Culture (London: Routledge, 
2009).
14. Max Boot, War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World (New 
York: Penguin, 2007), 115, 196–204; Alex Roland, War and Technology: A Very Short Introduction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 73–74. 
advanced armies to overcome less well-equipped adversaries, especially in counter-
insurgencies.10 Yet that same decade saw some of the most strident assertions 
linking ascendancy on the modern battlefield to “revolutionary” technological 
innovations. Contemporary military theorists suggested that advances in modern 
information and communications technologies were ushering in a “Revolution 
in Military Affairs” (RMA) that would, again, change the very nature of warfare. 
To bolster this case, commentators such as Andrew Krepinevich argued that this 
development was merely the latest example of a pattern of technologically driven 
revolutions that had shaped European warfare (it was a consistently ethnocentric 
thesis) over several centuries. Krepinevich thus characterised the latter half of the 
nineteenth century in familiar terms, as undergoing a “Land Warfare Revolution” 
propelled by “increases in the volume, range, and accuracy of fire [which was] 
further enhanced by improvements in artillery design and manufacturing, and by 
the development of the machine gun.”11 
Some academics were receptive to this conception of military history driven 
by successive RMAs, such as the contributors to the 2001 volume of essays The 
Dynamics of Military Revolution, edited by MacGregor Knox and Williamson 
Murray.12 Others, such as Colin S. Grey, Brice Harris, and Jeremy Black, have 
been far more sceptical, warning against over-stating the transformative impact of 
technological innovations. And the recent coalition campaigns waged in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (which, pace J. F. C. Fuller, proved rather “muscular,” especially in their 
demand for well-trained infantry), have reinforced how much has not changed in 
the conduct of modern war over the course of the last 100 years.13 Nevertheless, even 
if most authors of military history now eschew a crude technological determinism, 
the tendency to (over)stress “revolutionary” transformations in the conduct of war 
driven by technological innovations persists. It is evident in Max Boot’s 2006 text 
War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World; it is evident 
in Alex Roland’s 2016 overview of the subject, War and Technology: A Very Short 
Introduction.14
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15. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914–1920 
(London: HMSO, 1922), 878; A. H. Osman, “Pigeons in the Great War,” in Pigeons in Two 
World Wars, ed. Colin Osman (London: Racing Pigeon Publishing, 1976), 8.
16. R. L. DiNardo and Austin Bay, “Horse-Drawn Transport in the German Army,” Jour-
nal of Contemporary History 23 (1988): 129; R. L. DiNardo, Mechanized Juggernaut or Military 
Anachronism: Horses and the German Army of WWII (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 2008), 39; 
Anthony Brett-James, 1812 (London: Macmillan, 1973),10.
Where, then, in this vision of “warfare in the machine age” (to use Geyer’s 
phrase) do the dogs that accompanied the French expeditionary force to Madagascar 
in 1895 fit? At first glance, they might indeed seem simply to be a manifestation 
of that old European tradition of using “war dogs” in conflicts of conquest and 
colonisation. Yet it would be more correct to see them as representing an altogether 
more recent phenomenon: the mobilisation of animals on an unprecedented 
scale as a response to battlefield challenges posed by technological developments 
affecting the conduct of war. In short, their use provides graphic evidence that 
machine did not displace muscle in late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-
century warfare. “Machine warfare” created a historically unprecedented demand 
for muscle. Consider the British Empire’s mobilisation of animals during the First 
World War. In November 1918, at the close of the conflict, the British Empire 
counted 791,696 draught and riding animals with its armies in all theatres: 
510,000 horses; 225,311 mules; 36,834 camels; 8,425 bullocks; 11,028 donkeys. 
In addition, they were utilising, world-wide, about 100,000 carrier pigeons (not 
to mention gas-detecting canaries and messenger and sentry dogs, whose precise 
numbers were not recorded).15 The exploitation of animals was thus as much a 
defining characteristic of modern warfare as was the impact of the technological 
innovations born of the industrial revolution. 
This point seems most clear in the case of equids. Without horses and mules 
(or, in the desert, camels), it would have been impossible to prosecute warfare on 
any substantial scale well into the twentieth century. Indeed, even the maturation 
of the internal combustion engine did not have a particularly swift impact on 
military logistics. Overall, World War II probably saw an even greater mobilisation 
of equids than World War I (a possibility not generally acknowledged in works by 
Anglophone historians, whose views are, perhaps, distorted by the atypical levels 
of mechanisation achieved by U.S. and British Empire forces). As R. L. DiNardo 
has established, when Hitler’s forces invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, they 
were dependent upon the 750,000 horses and mules that hauled their artillery, 
supply wagons, field kitchens, and ambulances and provided mounts for their 
cavalry divisions. The invasion force thus counted roughly one horse for every 
four men (the same proportion found in Napoleon’s Grande Armée in 1812). By 
early 1945, the Wehrmacht deployed some 1,198,724 horses in the field; a further 
1,500,000 had, by then, died in their service.16 
Rather than simply viewing this animal dependency as anachronistic, it might 
better be understood as actually indicative of warfare in the age of industrialisation. 
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17. F. M. L. Thompson, “Nineteenth-Century Horse Sense,” Economic History Review 29, 
no. 1 (1976): 60–81. See also Ann Norton Greene, Horses at Work: Harnessing Power in Industrial 
America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008); Clay McShane and Joel Tarr, The 
Horse in the City: Living Machines in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2011). 
18. David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 (London: 
Profile, 2006), xi; “Technology,” English Oxford Living Dictionaries on-line (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2016), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/technology [accessed 29 October 
2016].
19. For draught work, besides DiNardo, see Emmett M. Essin, Shave Tails and Bell Sharps: 
The History of the US Army Mule (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997); John Singleton, 
“Britain’s Military Use of Horses, 1914–1918,” Past & Present, no. 139 (1993): 178–203; Andrekos 
Varnava, “Fighting Asses: British Procurement of Cypriot Mules and Their Condition and Treat-
ment in Macedonia,” War in History 23 (2016): 489–515. For the continued utility of horse cavalry, 
see Stephen Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880–1918 (Aldershot, Hampshire, 
U.K.: Ashgate, 2008); Jean Bou, Light Horse: A History of Australia’s Mounted Arm (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); David Dorondo, Riders of the Apocalypse: German Cavalry and 
Modern Warfare, 1870–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2012).
20. Indicative examples would include Peter Shaw Baker, Animal War Heroes (London: A. 
C. Black, 1933); John C. Burnam, A Soldier’s Best Friend: Scout Dogs and their Handlers in the Viet-
After all, as economic and urban historians have now demonstrated, both the 
industrial revolution generally and the growth of modern cities in particular were 
as dependent upon horse-power as upon steam-power. Indeed, the point about 
the machine age’s reliance on animal muscle is particularly well illustrated by the 
relationship between the growth of railways and that of the national horse herd 
in the United Kingdom. This reached a peak of over 3 million by the end of the 
nineteenth century. The railway companies were major employers of horses. They 
were used directly on the lines in marshalling yards for shunting wagons and 
employed in even greater numbers in the collection and distribution of goods and 
people from terminals and stations.17 
Recognising that the economies of the machine age were in fact characterised 
by an increase in the exploitation of animal muscle ought to have implications for 
how military historians approach this period. Heeding the suggestion of David 
Edgerton, they might refocus their attention to encompass not just the impact of 
innovation but also “the history of technology-in-use” (with “technology” usefully 
defined as the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes, which 
would include such subjects as animal breeding, management, and care).18 There 
have been a number of excellent works concerning the significance of equids in 
modern warfare, both as draught and riding animals.19 For the other animals 
mobilised in the service of industrial societies at war, the scholarly literature is 
practically non-existent. Besides a genre of popular titles celebrating animal heroics, 
and some useful autobiographical accounts by dog handlers from World War II 
and later conflicts, there has been little academic study of canine use in modern 
warfare.20 What has been written has tended to focus on World War II and the 
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nam War (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2003); Jilly Cooper, Animals in War (London: William 
Heinemann, 1983); William W. Putney, Always Faithful: A Memoir of the Marine Dogs of WWII 
(Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2001). 
21. See, for example, Karen Fischer, “Training Sled Dogs at Camp Rimini, 1942–1944,” 
Montana: The Magazine of Western History 34 (1984): 10–19; Michael G. Lemish, War Dogs: 
Canines in Combat (London: Brassey’s, 1996); Mary Kathleen Murray, The Contribution of the 
American Military Working Dog in Vietnam (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1998); 
Aaron Skabelund, “Breeding Racism: The Imperial Battlefields of the ‘German’ Shepherd Dog,” 
Society & Animals 16 (2008): 354–71. 
22. “Animals as Colleagues of the Soldier,” Sphere, 21 March 1903, 288. 
23. “The Use of Dogs in War,” Graphic, issue 1254 (9 December 1903): 723.
24. Karunanithy, Dogs of War, 111–12; Lemish, War Dogs, 8; Douglas Murphy, “Dogs of 
Destiny, Hounds from Hell: American Soldiers and Canines in the Mexican War,” Military 
History of the West 26 (1996): 35–48.
post-war conflicts, with Vietnam probably having the most extensive coverage.21 
The question of why, therefore, in the period circa 1880 to 1918, Europe’s armies 
effectively revived and expanded the military use of dogs demands attention. 
While historians of machine age warfare may not have considered this 
phenomenon, its apparent paradox was not lost on contemporaries. In 1903, a 
British journalist, in an article on the use of dogs by the French and German 
militaries, wrote, “we have reached an age of extraordinary mechanism, but animals 
still come largely into the service of man in the art of war.”22 There was, as has 
been noted, a strong degree of continuity about the service of dogs, especially in 
their employment in colonial warfare. French troops had been accompanied by 
dogs not just in Madagascar in the 1890s, but in earlier campaigns in Tunisia and 
Algeria.23 Their systematic use in so-called “civilised” warfare and their permanent 
integration into regular forces was, however, a novelty born of the machine age. 
Prior to the 1880s, locally sourced dogs had been used on an ad hoc basis for guard 
duties. Bloodhounds had been employed as guards and trackers by both sides 
in prisoner-of-war camps during the American Civil War (1861–1865). Dogs, 
either as regimental mascots or privately owned by officers, had accompanied 
units on campaign, the latter often for hunting, either for sport or to supplement 
rations.24 By the 1880s, however, experiments were taking place that would result 
in the professionalization of military dogs and dog handling. Animals would be 
carefully procured according to their temperament, capacity to learn, and physical 
characteristics. They and their handlers would be thoroughly trained in their duties 
and they would serve against “civilised” enemies in the field. They would establish 
a continuous tradition of canine military service that persists to the present day. 
That “extraordinary mechanism” of warfare had created demand for their 
services primarily in three main areas: locating both friendly (specifically wounded) 
and enemy troops (as sentries or on patrol), logistics, and communications. In large 
measure, these roles were functions of the dispersed tactics, extended ranges, and 
high ammunition expenditure characteristic of machine age combat. The Franco-
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25. Dennis E. Showalter, “Infantry Weapons, Infantry Tactics, and the Armies of Ger-
many,” European Studies Review 4 (1974): 119–40.
26. E. H. Richardson, War, Police and Watch Dogs (London: Blackwoods, 1910), 74–75. 
27. “The Use of Dogs in War,” Graphic, issue 1254 (9 December 1903): 725.
28. Maximillian Foster, “Dogs of War,” Idler, September 1902, 688; “War Dogs,” Sketch, 6 
June 1900, 298; E. E. Hulme, “Medical Work of the Knights Hospitallers of St John of Jeru-
salem,” Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine 6 (1938): 697–98; W. G. MacPherson, 
“The German Regulations for Utilising Voluntary Aid in War,” Journal of the Royal Army Medical 
Corps 1 (1903): 459–86. 
Prussian War of 1870–1871 had highlighted the significant challenges facing modern 
armies on fire-swept battlefields but dogs, it was swiftly recognised, offered potential 
solutions. Consider, first, the problems posed by the increased use of dispersed, open-
order formations by infantry as they responded to the increased range, accuracy, and 
rate of fire of breech-loading rifles, such as the Prussian Dreyse needle-gun and 
the French Chassepot.25 One practical problem arising from these tactics was the 
location and recovery of the wounded, who not only were now scattered across a 
wide area but had often taken shelter in deep cover and were thus quite hidden 
from view. The British dog trainer Edwin H. Richardson graphically illustrated this 
point with a melancholy photograph of the skeletal remains of an infantryman who 
had died at Gravelotte in 1870. He was not discovered until years later, still lying 
propped against the dense hedgerow where he had succumbed alone to his wounds, 
“the result,” Richardson commented, “of the non-use of Ambulance Dogs.”26
Such dogs not only were trained to locate the wounded but also carried a pouch 
containing a first-aid kit and possibly a flask of soup or brandy from which the injured 
might “gather strength” as they awaited the stretcher bearers. There was a long-standing 
civilian precedent for using dogs in this way: “after all, this is only a different version 
of what the famous St. Bernard dogs have been doing from time immemorial when 
succouring worn-out travellers on the Pass.”27 While experiments along these lines 
were taking place in a number of European armies by the 1890s, it was Germany who 
had taken a clear lead, often employing Scotch collies for this purpose. The German 
military had long benefitted from civilian voluntary and charitable auxiliary medical 
services, Freiwillige Krankenpflege, such as the Sanitats-zuge and Kranken-zuge (hospital 
trains) provided by the Order of St. John during the Franco-Prussian War. The Society 
of Red Cross Dogs was founded on a similar model in 1893. Its well-heeled members, 
numbering 1,000 by 1900 and “[including] many of the high princes and nearly all 
the leading generals of the army,” undertook the breeding, training, and supplying of 
ambulance dogs to the German army, on the basis of “philanthropy pure and simple,” 
from kennels in the Rhenish town of Lechenich.28
However, while ambulance dogs would clearly aid in the location of one’s 
own wounded soldiers, it was well appreciated that the canine’s keen senses of 
smell and hearing would be invaluable in warning of the proximity of hostile 
troops. Typically, and “depending on the strength of the wind and the tenderness 
of his nose,” a guard dog could easily detect a human at between 50 and 250 
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29. “The Dogs of War,” Manchester Times, 24 November 1893, 5.
30. Richardson, War, Police and Watch Dogs, 91–107; “The Dogs of War,” Saturday Review, 
28 December 1889, 739.
yards. Some very impressive claims were made: “[deerhounds] have “challenged” 
cavalry from a distance of three to five miles, according to the direction of the 
wind, and infantry from nearly two miles. They can be trained to announce the 
approach of a known friend in a quite different way, viz., by leaping to and fro or 
crouching down and jumping up by turns, but without the warning growl of the 
danger approach.”29 Historically, it was in the related, but distinct, roles of “sentry” 
(guarding a position) and “scout” (working with patrols to locate enemy troops) 
that the animals (medium- to large-sized sheep dogs came to be favoured) had 
been used most frequently. Richardson, writing in 1910, pointed to their recent 
use in “savage warfare” by the French in Africa, in government operations against 
guerrillas in Mexico, by the Russians in their 1877 war against the Ottomans, and 
by both sides during the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1904–1905. Richardson also 
noted that frontier forces, such as those of the Habsburgs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
had a long tradition of employing dogs, too. As with ambulance dogs, there were 
also useful precedents in civilian life; one British newspaper reported in 1889 that 
dogs were being used extensively, both by smugglers to carry contraband and by the 
customs officers attempting to track them, along the Franco-Belgian border.30 
British soldier removing bandages from the kit of a British dog during World War I 
[Library of Congress]
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31. “Dogs as Soldiers,” Answers to Correspondents on Every Question under the Sun, 16 Feb-
ruary 1889, 187. 
32. “The Dogs of War,” Saturday Review, 28 December 1889, 739. 
33. “The Use of Dogs in War,” Graphic, issue 1254 (9 December 1903): 724. 
34. “Drill Regulations for Machine-Gun Batteries,” trans. Paul T. Brockmann, in Selected Translations 
Pertaining to the Use and Value of Machine-Guns (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), 152.
It is likely that the Japanese use of dogs for scouting work was evidence of 
the influence of their German military advisors. They had begun experiments 
using dogs for “outpost work” in 1886, especially in association with the jäger 
(light infantry) regiments, whose duties traditionally included tactical (local) 
reconnaissance and flank protection.31 The potential benefits of employing scout 
dogs were outlined by one contemporary:
As scouts in front and on each side of the line of march, they are 
expected to be likewise useful, and are to undertake some duties 
which now tell severely both on man and horses. Woods, ravines, 
farm-buildings, or hamlets, lying close to the line of march, have 
always to be reconnoitred and searched ere troops can pass them, 
and the labour and delay caused are serious. Parties must be detailed, 
perhaps for considerable distances . . . and the column has to halt 
till their work is done. The constant recurrence of such duties is very 
fatiguing, and in an enclosed country it is not easy for a horseman 
to efficiently perform them. It is thought that a few good dogs, 
ranging widely from the scouts, would save them an immensity of 
trouble and do the work equally well.32
However, it was not merely the dogs’ sense of smell that was to be called 
upon on active service; their physical strength would prove an asset too. It was 
quickly recognised that, if necessary, some ambulance dogs might help with the 
actual transport of the wounded from the battlefield, a reminder that, at this 
time, dogs were frequently employed in light draught work across continental 
Europe.33 It was, therefore, very natural also to see in the dog a solution to another 
of the challenges of modern warfare: battlefield logistics. Small arms ammunition 
expenditure had been, in particular, a growing concern as infantrymen were armed 
with breech-loading, repeating, and, by the 1890s, magazine-fed, bolt-action rifles. 
These weapons not only increased the infantry’s rate of fire, and thus the number 
of rounds they expended in action, but also increased the depth of the fire-swept 
zone, making it dangerous to locate ammunition carts too close to the firing line, 
and thus difficult to resupply troops once they were under heavy fire. The Franco-
Prussian War had, once again, given notice of the changed conditions, with some 
units depleting all their rounds in particularly severe actions, but the adoption 
of automatic machine guns such as the Maxim and Hotchkiss in the 1890s had 
exacerbated the problem. German regulations of 1904 stressed the point: “Timely 
renewal of the ammunition supply is of the utmost importance . . . The officers and 
men charged with renewing the exhausted supply must make the utmost efforts 
and employ all means to keep the firing line constantly supplied.”34 Dogs could 
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either haul small carts, and even, as in the Belgian army, serve as teams for wheel-
mounted machine guns, or be used as pack animals.35 A British journalist who 
witnessed a German “exhibition of the capabilities of war dogs” in 1895 described 
how “the dogs were employed as ammunition carriers, each animal carrying a 
weight equal to 250 shotted cartridges in a sort of saddle on his back. In this 
manner they supplied the line of firing soldiers with fresh ammunition.”36 
Naturally, the dogs used for draught work tended to be stronger and heavier 
animals, often those especially bred for such tasks. Mountain warfare posed especial 
challenges. In 1915, Allan Alexander “Scotty” Allan, reputedly “the greatest dog 
driver of the century,” worked with the French officer Lieutenant René Haas to 
supply 450 Alaskan huskies to the Alpine Chasseurs operating in the Vosges 
mountains. There, in winter, they hauled sledges that maintained supply lines 
in conditions that defeated all other forms of transport: Allan “relates that one 
section carried ninety tons of ammunition to a battery within four days to a place 
that men, mules and horses had been trying to reach ineffectually for fourteen 
days.” In spring and summer, these remarkable dogs proved equally useful: “after 
the snows had melted they pulled trucks on narrow gauge light railways, eleven 
dogs being able to draw a ton up precipitous slopes.”37
As has been noted, the use of dogs both as sentinels or trackers, or for draught 
work, had long-standing precedents, and was mirrored, in contemporary civilian 
usage. The other emerging duty of military dogs, carrying dispatches, also had 
some established civilian parallels in parts of Europe, such as Austria “where four-
footed messengers have for many years been taught to carry letters to the snow 
bound villages of the Alpine high lands.”38 Their use in this function by soldiers was 
more novel (although there is some suggestion that the Ancient Greeks may have 
employed dogs in this fashion during sieges).39 Yet, once more, it was intimately 
connected to the challenges of modern combat. It reflected the impact of dispersed 
tactics, extended ranges, and the sheer scale of modern battlefields, all of which 
militated against the use of conventional forms of signalling. Even at comparatively 
short distances, shouts and bugle calls were lost in the din of battle. Dispatch riders 
were all too vulnerable to enemy fire and signalling flags were similarly conspicuous 
besides being limited in their effective range. A dog, however, “is not only much 
quicker than a man, and can cover ground where no cycle could go, but he also 
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has the advantage in being almost invisible to the enemy.” Witnesses to early 
demonstrations in the 1880s and 1890s claimed to have seen messenger dogs carry 
dispatches over one and one-half kilometres in around two minutes and noted that 
“dogs racing along the battle-front will dodge bullets by running zigzag, and develop 
a marvellous talent for taking advantage of every cover, running through the highest 
grass or along the safe side of rocks and fallen trees.”40
Such demonstrations quickly established the viability of the dispatch dog, 
and systematic programmes of training were developed in the German, Habsburg, 
and French armies. The latter proved particularly bold in their approach. In most 
instances, dogs were treated as a one-way form of communication. Thoroughly 
trained to pay no mind to bullets or explosions, to negotiate obstacles, and to 
ignore distractions, they were expected to return to their handler on being released 
from the firing line. The French, however, in addition to the messenger dog, trained 
also chiens de liaison who were accustomed to work with two handlers and were 
thus capable of maintaining two-way communications. Such dogs were especially 
useful in lateral communication, allowing effective liaison between units operating 
next to each other in the front line, which often proved a significant challenge in 
the trench warfare of 1914–1918.41
The relationship of the messenger dog to innovative technologies is a particularly 
interesting one. Dogs searching “the empty battlefield” for wounded men, or 
warning of the enemy’s proximity, and those carrying munitions, equipment, and 
supplies, were essentially servants of the new weapons technologies. The messenger 
and liaison dogs, on the other hand, seem more akin to unlikely competitors to 
sophisticated emerging communication technologies: the telegraph and, latterly, the 
telephone and the wireless. Yet these nascent technologies, while perhaps offering a 
revolutionary potential, had stark limitations in wartime. Animals, and not just dogs, 
offered a viable contingency. During the Franco-Prussian War, roving squadrons of 
Uhlans had soon severed French telegraph lines and isolated French garrisons had 
defaulted to dispatching messages to Paris by carrier pigeons procured from civilians. 
Paris itself came to rely upon an improvised carrier pigeon service that, during a 
four-month siege, carried 150,000 official and 1,000,000 private communications 
into the beleaguered city.42 The military implications were not lost on continental 
soldiers. In the aftermath of the conflict, military lofts were established across the 
continent. It has been estimated that as many as 500,000 birds were eventually 
mobilised by the rival armies over the course of the First World War (the French 
monument to carrier pigeons, dedicated in Lille after the war, estimated that some 
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20,000 had died in their service. In Belgium, a nation of pigeon fanciers in 1914, 
about a million pigeons were seized or destroyed by the occupying forces).43
In the years leading up to 1914, neither the development of wire-dependent 
telephones nor bulky, unreliable, and insecure wireless sets suggested to continental 
European militaries that they might safely dispense with their animal messengers. 
Pigeons were primarily seen as a means of communication over longer distances, 
although during the war, in the interest of both speed in relaying information 
and effective liaison between infantry and gunners, mobile lofts (motorised or 
horse drawn) were often pushed up dangerously close to the front line. The 
British sometimes operated their lofts within 2,000 yards of German positions.44 
Generally, at tactical distances, dogs had advantages over pigeons: they could carry 
longer messages (usually in a pouch attached to the collar); they could run at 
night; they coped better with rain, snow, and high winds; and, where liaison dogs 
were available, they offered two-way communication. Of all the dog soldiers of 
1914–1918, messengers would prove the most useful.
By the outbreak of that conflict, dogs were an established part of all the major 
continental European armies. Contemporaries did not regard their presence 
as antithetical to modernity but rather as characteristic of the age. The British 
journalist Sommerville Story wrote in 1917, “the use of dogs in warfare was, of 
course, not invented in the present war, though their utility has been systematized 
and given more scientific scope than was ever the case before.”45 This “scientific 
scope” was particularly evident in the nature and thoroughness of training regimes 
that instructed dogs in their specific duties to a very sophisticated degree (“dogs 
on sentry or scouting duty are taught to announce their discoveries by low growls, 
indeed some of the more highly trained ones manage to make known items of 
intelligence which they are able to give merely by gestures, never uttering a sound 
while on duty”),46 acclimatised them to the din and confusion of battle, and taught 
them to distinguish friend from (likely) foe, as in this description from 1893: 
in the German training process some of the soldiers put on French 
and Russian uniforms to represent the enemy . . . The pseudo 
French and Russians then do all in their power to arouse the dogs’ 
dislike by beating and ill-treating the animals, and shouting loudly 
at them in the two hostile languages. When the dogs’ temper is 
thoroughly excited against their fictitious adversaries, the German 
soldiers come to the front to pet and caress the angry animals and 
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reward them with meat or some other canine delicacy—a sure road 
to their favour. Thus the distinction is speedily learnt.47
Doubtless such exercises were stressful for the canine recruit, as indeed must 
have been other elements of their training, such as being accustomed to rifle fire 
and explosions. Yet it is striking that the handling of dogs was generally marked 
by a rejection of unnecessary cruelty or harshness in their treatment and a strong 
emphasis on fostering emotional bonds between dog and man. The British dog 
trainer E. H. Richardson is typical in this regard, commenting that “complete 
confidence and affection must exist between dogs and keeper, and the man whose 
only idea of control is by coercion and fear is quite useless.” A wartime German 
memorandum revealed that they operated on the same principle: “Those men only 
are to be accepted who have a genuine love of dogs. On this essentially the animals’ 
performance depends.”48 This attitude, too, was a manifestation of the essential 
modernity of the revival in the military use of dogs; such views were characteristic 
of a late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century rejection of René Descartes’s assertion 
that animals were simply flesh and bone automatons that “have no reason at all.”49
Although far from universal in wider society, a willingness to recognise the 
capacity of dogs to think and feel and even exhibit a degree of understanding of the 
tasks they were being asked to perform, was an important part of the success that 
the best military dog handlers of this period enjoyed. Again, Richardson put it well: 
“I have found that many men, who are supposedly dog experts, are not sufficiently 
sympathetic, and are apt to regard the dog too much as a machine. They do not study 
the psychology of their charges sufficiently.”50 The best scientific opinion of the day 
concurred. For Charles Darwin, the variations in the cognitive capacities between 
species were distinctions of degree not kind: “there is no fundamental difference 
between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties.” And it was clear to 
him that animals led rich emotional lives: “but man himself cannot express love and 
humility by external signs so plainly as does a dog, when with drooping ears, hanging 
lips, flexuous body, and wagging tail he greets his beloved master.”51 Recognising 
this wise and scientifically informed understanding of animals’ capacity to feel and 
to reason is important in explaining not only the success of the military dog training 
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programmes but also the attitudes displayed towards animal soldiers during the First 
World War. It is, for example, in this context that we might best understand the 
belief that animals were capable of, and should be rewarded for, performing acts of 
valour. Thus, during the war, the French initiated the practice (later emulated by the 
British and Americans) of awarding decorations for gallantry to both dogs (who 
received “collars of honour”) and pigeons (the “war ring”).52
Whatever one’s position on the contentious question of animal consciousness, 
the performance of dogs once in combat generally vindicated the faith shown in 
them. German Lieutenant General Wilhelm Balck recorded that messenger dogs
proved very good up to a distance of 2 kilometres . . .  Only a very 
small percentage of the dogs employed were failures. Some dogs 
carried more than 30 messages per day . . . Carrier pigeons and 
message dogs frequently were the only means of communication 
between the fighting troops and the commanders.53
These dogs often demonstrated a remarkable capacity to learn from the new and 
terrifying circumstances in which they found themselves. Balck noted that “fre-
quently under very heavy fire dogs sought cover in shelters and bombproofs and 
continued their run carelessly as soon as the fire became weaker,” while a British 
Group of war dogs decorated for bravery by the French War Department for 
heroic work during World War I [Library of Congress]
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dog “keeper” noted, “I could see that Major was actually dodging the shells. He 
took a wide sweep from where the first shell fell, and kept working out further.”54
The problem most armies experienced was securing enough animals to meet 
the insatiable demand for “muscle” made by this machine age warfare. The German 
army was the most systematic in its use of dogs (with an official establishment of 
12 dogs per regiment) and fielded the highest number in 1914, around 6,000 
accompanying its armies in the opening campaigns. They were also the most 
organised in terms of reserves as well, with dogs registered by the Society of Red 
Cross Dogs and with other breeders’ associations, such as that for the German 
Shepherd, all being assessed and made available for military service. Even so, and 
in common with the other major combatants, the Germans were, by 1917, forced 
to appeal for new recruits via the press: “the army again needs dogs between the 
ages of one and four years old . . . They must be offered free. The breeds required 
are sheepdogs, fox terriers, Airedale terriers and mongrels of those breeds.” Over 
the course of the conflict the Germans employed some 30,000 dogs.55 
These animals shared the hardships, dangers, and suffering of front-line 
soldiers; at the end of the war, the French demobilised 15,000 military dogs but 
recorded 5,000 dead or “missing.” For some of the dogs, as for human soldiers, the 
stress proved too much. “Poor Maggie was shell-shocked,” lamented the keeper of 
one British messenger dog who had died near Hill 60 in the Ypres Salient in early 
1918. While she had lived, though, he noted, she had beaten the runner every time 
and never made a mistake.56 
The British army had, in fact, been very slow to recognise the potential of 
dogs such as Maggie. Indeed, the British army provides a particularly interesting 
case study of the relationship between the muscular and the mechanical in 
modern warfare. Notwithstanding a historiographical reputation for technophobia 
and hippophilia, the Victorian and Edwardian army exhibited a consistent 
preference for mechanical solutions, wherever feasible, to emerging problems. 
The “mechanisation” of the army thus began in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Trials with steam traction engines for draught work were held as early as 1858 
and one accompanied the army on campaign in the Ashanti War of 1873–1874. 
Other than the widespread use of railways, the British were “the first nation to 
employ mechanical power in any numbers in warfare, when using traction engines 
and several steam lorries [55 vehicles of various makes in total] . . . during the 
1899–1902 [Second South African] War.”57 By 1914, a significant proportion 
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of the army’s transport (including in the cavalry) was motorised. In 1915, a fully 
mechanised combat unit, a battery of 9.2 inch howitzers drawn by American 
Holt caterpillar tractors, was deployed at Neuve Chappelle (10–12 March). The 
following year, the British deployed the first tanks in combat.58 
The corollary of this willingness to embrace the potential of various new-
fangled mechanical contraptions was a reluctance to consider innovative ways of 
exploiting animal muscle. It was, given the limitations of the nascent technologies, 
unfeasible to dispense wholly with horses and mules (and camels and elephants in 
other climes) but the use of both dogs and carrier pigeons was, although considered, 
firmly rejected before the war. The challenges posed by industrial warfare on the 
Western Front, however, forced the British to re-think and they found themselves 
scrabbling to catch up the German and French lead in their use of animals. 
The military employment of both animals on the continent had been noted 
and debated in Britain. They had their dedicated advocates, notably Captain H. 
W. T Allatt for the pigeon and Major Edwin H. Richardson for the dog.59 Allatt, 
for a while at least, enjoyed the most success. The army experimented with pigeons 
throughout the 1880s and he was eventually asked to establish a carrier pigeon 
section. This, however, saw only limited service. During the Second South African 
War, the besieged garrison of Ladysmith had maintained contact with Durban 
via carrier pigeon but this system had been extemporised; the Durban Homing 
German Red Cross dogs during World War I [Library of Congress]
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Society had volunteered their birds when war broke out.60 There remained serious 
doubts about the viability of a carrier pigeon service in modern warfare. One 
British commentator noted, “their postal service will obviously only work one 
way [and] as a means of sending messages to a moving force they are utterly 
unavailable.” Nor would it be practical to supply every likely location for a military 
headquarters with a loft in advance of hostilities. There, too, was the question 
of their reliability; it was feared that they could not be depended upon, being 
apt to “get discouraged or lost” in difficult conditions. In contrast, the “Telegraph 
Division” that had served in South Africa had proved an unqualified success. The 
War Office thus abolished the pigeon section in 1907.61
For his part, Richardson had much success in training dogs for both police 
and military work and in supplying them to foreign powers. Several of his 
ambulance dogs served with the Russian army in Manchuria during the war with 
Japan, 1904–1905, and with the Spanish in Morocco in 1909. However, his offer 
to supply similar dogs to the British army during the Second South African War 
had been turned down. Inevitably, British troops in South Africa had adopted 
local dogs, and these had sometimes served as sentinels for the laagers of flying 
columns and the garrisons of blockhouses. As Richardson commented, “how 
infinitely superior would it have been had each regiment been provided with a 
corps of properly tested and trained dogs, these dogs handled by men already 
taught how to put them to the fullest advantage.”62 His was not a lone voice; 
similar views were aired in the press:
Dogs are trained by the Germans to carry ammunition to the firing 
line during a battle. At the Modder River [28 November 1899] the 
fire of the enemy swept the plain with such vehemence that it was 
impossible for the “carriers” with the reserve ammunition to cross the 
ground and take supplies to the fighting force. In this case dogs could 
have done, probably in perfect safety, what men could not do.63
The experience of modern warfare on the veldt does seem to have caused the 
army to re-consider the case for dogs, at least for a while. Richardson was asked 
to attend manoeuvres in Scotland with his ambulance dogs. General Sir Charles 
Tucker put them “through severe tests” and “recommended their adoption.” Shortly 
thereafter, two of Richardson’s sentry dogs accompanied an expedition by Ghurkhas 
of the Indian army against the Abor people, a mountain tribe of the Indian-Chinese 
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border, in 1911–1912. According to press reports, these “proved their efficiency.” Yet 
these experiments failed to sway the War Office in favour of their use.64
Richardson’s endeavours to persuade the army to employ dogs foundered on 
both institutional and cultural obstacles. The War Office’s objections seem rooted 
in a belief that, under the conditions of modern war, dogs would, like pigeons, 
simply prove temperamentally unreliable: “the suggestion of ‘cowardice’ is spoken 
. . . It is felt that long training in good behaviour in front of a row of Maxims 
[machine-guns] would be essential before any material advantage could be 
achieved.”65 Besides, outside of agriculture and sport, there were fewer working 
dogs in Edwardian Britain compared to continental Europe. This was largely the 
result of animal welfare legislation passed in the Victorian era. The dog-cart bill of 
1854 had protected canines from the cruelty of this form of exploitation, from the 
damage done by hard roads to soft paws and the pain and injury of poorly designed 
collars and harnesses combined with heavy loads. The admirable sentiments that 
drove such legislation were also a factor in the debate over the use of dogs by 
the army. Renewed calls in 1914 that dogs be employed for draught work were 
successfully opposed by the National Canine Defence League.66
So, alone among the major combatants, the British army (officially) went to war in 
1914 with neither dogs nor pigeons. Yet they would soon have recourse to the latter and, 
following on from this, they would eventually turn also to the dog. The key issue was 
the problem of maintaining battlefield communications, for recent technical innovations 
proved unequal to the challenge of the war. It is important to understand the scale of 
the problem. At the strategic and operational levels, the telegraph was the British army’s 
preferred communication technology. During the manoeuvre battles of 1914, signallers 
were, inevitably, heavily reliant on the existing civilian networks. Once the war settled 
into a static “war of positions,” the telephone was recognised as “the most practical and 
swiftest means of liaison.”67 Yet, like the telegraph, it was dependent upon its wires, 
which, if laid on the ground, were frequently cut by shell fire or by careless traffic. The 
only really secure lines were buried underground, yet these required a great deal of labour 
to install and could only be established in semi-permanent positions. Even then there 
was a significant problem. As Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh, Royal Engineers, noted, 
“the telephone and the telegraph, except the Fullerphone [developed in 1915 and only 
available in quantity by 1916] are liable to be over heard by the enemy, depending on 
the extent to which the circuit is ‘earthed.’ It is therefore very dangerous to use them for 
important messages within 1,000 yards or so of the enemy.”68
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Wireless telegraphy (W/T) was also problematic. The most powerful sets 
were so cumbersome they had to be transported by wagon. Beyond poor mobility, 
Pakenham-Walsh again noted their insecurity: “at present there is no method of 
preventing any other station within range and in tune reading any message sent 
by wireless.” Messages could be encrypted but “the time taken in enciphering and 
deciphering the message may mean valuable time is lost.” In practise, therefore, 
“W/T is slower than line telegraphy as far as actual transmission of messages is 
concerned.” Furthermore “by means of directional wireless the situation of active 
wireless stations may be located [by the enemy].” Wireless could also be “jammed” 
and indeed the number of wireless sets in any one area was “limited by the necessity 
of avoiding ‘interference’ between them.”69 Only by the summer of 1918 were 
sufficient quantities of portable and (relatively) robust continuous wave (CW) sets 
available to establish wireless as a viable means of communication. Even then, as 
R. E. Priestley, who worked with the early CW sets, noted, they were “extremely 
delicate” and “there were literally dozens of ways in which they could go wrong.”70
The difficulties were most apparent below divisional level and especially 
where units had either advanced beyond their wire networks or had become 
isolated on the battlefield. Visual signalling, with flags, lanterns, or electric flash 
lights, was, at best a supplement to be used when lines were unavailable. As French 
Colonel Paul Azan advised his new American comrades in 1917, their use “is a 
delicate task for [signallers] must manage, by choosing their position well, to be 
seen by those with whom they wish to communicate, without being exposed to 
the enemy: such conditions are frequently impossible to realise.”71 There was no 
shortage of ingenuity or innovation in attempting to solve this problem. Rockets, 
flares, and Verey lights were widely used for making pre-arranged signals such 
as calling for a barrage, but were clearly limited in how much information they 
could convey and were visible to the enemy. Ground telegraphy, such as the British 
“power buzzer,” had no wires to be cut and was effective up to 3,000 yards, but 
the equipment was heavy and insecure. In these circumstances, generals could 
meticulously plan battles, but once they were underway, effective command and 
control was next door to impossible. Maintaining communications required front-
line troops to have a variety of methods available to them, from which the most 
appropriate could be selected depending on the contingent conditions. In many 
instances, the only option was the human runner. These, of course, proved all too 
vulnerable, especially with the development of barrage fire, which could create 
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near impenetrable barriers to (human) movement. It was in this context that, 
belatedly, the British army turned to animal messengers. 
The key individual was Alec Waley, who accompanied the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF) to France in 1914 as a second lieutenant in the Intelligence Corps. 
During the battles of 1914, as signallers struggled to establish and maintain fixed 
communication lines, Waley borrowed some pigeons from the French army. As 
the fighting began to settle into the trenches, “under his enthusiastic impulse [the 
pigeon service] proved its value, for when . . . the Germans were closing in on Ypres, 
and the roads through the town became shell traps, Alec Waley was a well-known 
figure taking to the front line the pigeons that saved the life of many a dispatch 
rider.”72 On 28 July 1915 the nascent Carrier Pigeon Service was taken over by 
the Director of Army Signals, with Waley as “officer commanding.” He proved a 
tireless and capable officer. By the end of the war, he, and his 380 “pigeoneers,” 
would be responsible for lofts (fixed and mobile) operating 20,000 birds and for 
having trained some 90,000 soldiers (British Empire, Portuguese, and American) 
to care for and fly pigeons in the front line.73 
The birds proved swift and reliable. During November 1915, it was recorded 
from a loft at Poperinghe that 39 percent of pigeon-borne messages were received 
within fifteen minutes of the bird being tossed and 81 percent within twenty-
five minutes. Only 2 percent of the birds had gone missing. This was far faster 
than runners could manage. In some circumstances, pigeons even out-paced wire. 
In May 1916, Waley recorded: “officer i/c Divisional Signals . . . mentioned that 
when messages were over 30 words the pigeon nearly always beat the wire, as a 
certain amount of time was always lost in re-transmitting the wire from Brigade 
to Divisional Headquarters.”74 When units advanced beyond their wire networks, 
pigeons were frequently the primary means of communication rearward. When 
Waley visited the BEF’s II Corps on 31 July 1917, the opening day of Third Ypres, 
he was informed that “75% of the news which had come in from the firing line 
had been received by pigeon.”75
That the British army had erred in rejecting the carrier pigeon as a means 
of communication before 1914 had become rapidly apparent under the actual 
conditions of machine age warfare. Nor should their use be seen merely as a reflection 
of the limitations of the new communications technologies; as with equids and dogs, 
technological innovation created new demands for pigeon “muscle.” In January 
1916, for example, cavalry signallers, then serving dismounted, sought to maximise 
the potential of their wireless sets by using them in conjunction with their pigeons. 
Deploying their bulky wagon-carried equipment, they established a wireless station 
behind the trenches, alongside their loft. From this they could contact a lighter 
receiving-only set in the trenches and thus respond to the messages carried back 
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by pigeon: “by this means, two-way working was established in a novel fashion.”76 
Indeed, the most technologically advanced branches of the British army, for example, 
the Royal Flying Corps and the Tank Corps (originally “Heavy Section Machine 
Gun Corps”), were among the most avid users of pigeons. On 13 September 1916, 
Waley had “spent the morning at ‘Tanks’ arranging for birds and giving Officers 
details re use and handling of carrier pigeons.” Two days later the tanks would be 
committed to battle for the first time, complete with their complement of pigeons. 
Again, they swiftly proved their worth, the crews tossing their birds to report the 
capture of enemy positions, send “SOS” messages, and request artillery barrages 
when no other means of communication was available to them.77
The success of the carrier pigeon service demonstrated that the pre-war fears 
that animals would be temperamentally unequal to the stress of modern warfare 
were mistaken, and thus paved the way for the British to introduce messenger dogs, 
too. Waley, again, would be an instrumental figure. Useful as carrier pigeons had 
proved, he had faced operational challenges that dogs might help meet. Since the 
BEF had been playing catch-up in its use of pigeons, there were never enough to 
meet demand from the front line. British pigeon fanciers had, in the remarkable spirit 
of volunteerism that characterised the age, made thousands of trained, well-bred, 
and valuable birds freely available, and Waley worked effectively with Lieutenant-
Colonel A. H. Osman, who was organising the carrier pigeon services within the 
United Kingdom. Yet the war’s appetite for pigeons was insatiable. Osman had to 
provide birds not just to France but also to a home defence network, to maritime 
forces (especially the volunteer trawler crews, who played an important role in 
mine-sweeping but whose vessels were not generally equipped with wireless), and, 
in 1918, to a specialist carrier pigeon service for the newly created Royal Air Force; 
Osman noted that “there were lofts at all important aerodromes at the conclusion 
of the war.”78 Waley, characteristically adopting best practice from the French, had 
established his own breeding lofts. Yet he could never supply quite enough birds, 
and often pigeons that were too young, inexperienced, and poorly trained were 
dispatched prematurely to the front line and tossed into strong wind, or driving 
snow and rain, and were, inevitably, lost.79
Indeed, while pigeons proved far more resilient than had been expected (coping 
well with the mud and rain of Passchendaele and, although not immune to poison 
gas, generally proving able to deliver messages despite its use), environmental 
conditions often did take a heavy toll of birds’ lives, especially during the peculiarly 
severe winter of 1916–1917 and the heavy storms of late 1917.80 Nor would they 
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fly in darkness (although both the French and British were experimentally training 
birds for night flying by 1918).81 By 1917, Waley appreciated that messenger 
dogs would be a more-than-viable supplementary means of communication. 
Suitably trained, they adapted more quickly to new surroundings (pigeons in 
mobile lofts needed, ideally, between a week and a fortnight to settle in a new 
location); they ran well at night too and could be relied upon in all weather 
conditions. In November 1917, Waley visited 4th, 6th, and 3rd French Armies 
“to study organisation of the Messenger Dog Service” and the French war office’s 
kennels in Paris. The following month, he attended trials with the British 4th 
Army and observed “actual use made of dogs from the trenches” by the French 
16th Division, with a view to establishing a dog messenger service for the BEF.82 
This was, undeniably, late in the day, reflecting the greater reluctance to consider 
dogs than pigeons for military service that had been evident pre-war. Yet, whatever 
the official War Office attitude, some privately sourced dogs had been serving 
with individual British units since 1914. Unlike in South Africa, some of these 
were highly trained animals, often supplied by Edwin Richardson. He himself 
had travelled to Belgium with the British Red Cross on the outbreak of war with 
some ambulance dogs but had been forced to abort his mission by the rapidity of 
the German advance. An Airedale terrier (a favourite breed of Richardson’s) that 
he had trained for sentry work accompanied the 2nd Norfolks to France at the 
same time, only to be killed by shellfire on the Aisne. As the war settled into the 
trenches, Richardson asserted that both he and the War Office began to receive 
more and more letters from officers in the front line requesting dogs, initially 
Pigeons in 
baskets being 
loaded onto 
a train, 
Dunkerque, 
France, during 
World War I 
[Library of 
Congress]
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mostly for sentry and patrol work. Richardson, wherever possible, seems to have 
done his best to oblige, supplying a number of dogs for a variety of purposes. For 
example, in 1915 he gifted an Irish terrier puppy called Norah to a Canadian 
friend, Thomas Radford, then serving as a private in the Canadian Veterinary 
Corps. Norah, originally intended to be a pet, subsequently established a fearsome 
reputation as a ratter in the trenches, and was praised by senior medical officers 
for disposing of so many disease-bearing rodents (100,000 in under three years 
according to one press report!).83 However, in terms of promoting the official use 
of war dogs, by far the most significant animals Richardson supplied were the 
trained messenger dogs he provided, beginning with two Airedales called Wolf 
and Prince for Colonel Ormonde Winter, Royal Field Artillery, serving with the 
BEF’s 11th Division in the winter of 1916–1917.84
There are some grounds for treating Richardson’s account of the adoption of 
messenger dogs by the BEF with a degree of caution. His 1920 book British War 
Dogs should be understood as part of his continued advocacy of the permanent 
establishment of dog sections by the military. He naturally places his own efforts front 
and centre and seems rather to marginalise the substantial contribution ultimately 
made by Waley. He is somewhat vague on both chronology (the messenger dog 
service was not properly organised until 1918) and the relatively small number of 
animals he trained and supplied. Yet, in reproducing reports from the “keepers” 
handling dogs at the front, he provided remarkable evidence of the utility of war 
Edwin H. Richardson with British Red Cross dogs during World War I [Library 
of Congress]
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dogs in machine age warfare. Prince and Wolf first saw action in early 1917, attached 
to gunners acting as liaison with the infantry or as forward observation officers. 
Led up to the front line in darkness, through winding communication trenches 
and a barrage, they both carried dispatches their first night in the trenches: “[they] 
reached brigade headquarters, travelling a distance as the crow flies of 4,000 yards 
over ground they had never seen before and over exceptionally difficult terrain . . . 
all visual communication having failed.” When Canadian infantry stormed Vimy 
Ridge on 8 April, they were employed with an artillery observation post supporting 
the attack: “all the telephones were broken and visual signalling was impossible. The 
dogs were the first to bring through news.”85
Richardson gives the impression that, in the aftermath of these successes, 
the use of messenger dogs by British Empire forces in the field increased rapidly. 
A War Dog School was established at Shoeburyness, Essex, with Richardson in 
command. He noted demand not just for messengers but for sentries too, to free up 
manpower guarding installations in the United Kingdom and for duties in France, 
Flanders, and Salonika. There, the front line often consisted of scattered outposts 
rather than continuous or deep, entrenched positions, and No Man’s Land was, in 
places, wide enough to be patrolled by cavalry. The usefulness of properly trained 
guard dogs in such a theatre was manifest.86 Even in the appalling environmental 
conditions of the Ypres salient in 1917, during the infamous Passchendaele 
offensive, the dogs proved themselves again and again: 
on dark and stormy nights they were invaluable. And the time 
in which they did their work was approximately the same as in 
daytime. The average speed of the dog was one-half to one-third 
of the time taken by runners in the daytime and at night less still. 
Runners have come in cut and bleeding from barbed wire and other 
obstacles, after having been lost for several hours in the darkness, 
while the dogs have come through safely and without delay.87
In the defensive operations of the following spring, British units with dogs contin-
ued to find them invaluable. “Keeper” Reid, one of the men Richardson had trained 
at Shoeburyness, wrote to him in late May 1918:
On May 2nd . . . I was sent to the 18th Div . . . At 10 p.m. the 
Hun came over on the [Queen Victoria’s Rifles]—my dog was at 
their Batt. Hdqtrs. They were cut off from the London Regt.; they 
released “Tweed” with the message “Send up reinforcements and 
small round ammunition.” He came through a Boche barrage—
three kilos. in 10 mins. The French were sent up and filled the gaps 
. . . otherwise Amiens would be in the hands of the Germans.88
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Yet, amongst the catalogue of canine achievements under fire that he chronicles, 
even Richardson quietly acknowledges that British military dog use throughout 
1917 was ad hoc and far from universally accepted. Officers who requested dogs 
got them, but, to Richardson’s frustration, the belief that dogs could not cope with 
the stress of modern battle remained prevalent. The officer who would establish the 
British Messenger Dog Sections on a systematic basis and integrate them effectively 
into the BEF’s conduct of operations was the pigeoneer-in-chief, Major Alec Waley. 
Having familiarised himself with the French messenger dog service in late 1917, 
and observed some of the British dogs already in action, he met Richardson in 
Shoeburyness on 5 January 1918. Showing the same energy and initiative he had 
in establishing the pigeon service, Waley had, by 14 January, arranged for wire to 
be placed around land allotted for his newly established “GHQ Central Kennels, 
Messenger Dog Service” at the BEF’s largest base depot, Étaples. Within a month 
this installation was operational. From this central kennel, dogs and keepers were 
posted to sectional kennels supporting front-line units. These sectional kennels had 
an establishment of one sergeant, sixteen men (the “keepers”), and two to three dogs 
per man. In action, keepers would accompany the dogs as far forward as brigade 
headquarters; the dogs would go into the line with a detail of infantry. Upon release 
they would return, bearing dispatches in a tin cylinder attached to their collars, to 
their keeper at brigade headquarters.89
Waley, as he had with the pigeon service, simultaneously built up the dog 
service from (close to) scratch, devised its operational procedures, trained dogs and 
men, and deployed them on active service in ever-increasing numbers throughout 
1918. His war diary, in his terse and matter-of-fact style, was soon recording his 
progress:
[16 April 1918] Visited 1st. Australian Brigade. [They] were 
attacked heavily in the night so that 6 dogs at Battalion Headquarters 
had been thoroughly tested. The 6 dogs had been released with 
messages and 5 had returned in excellent times. One, however, was 
still missing . . .90
What makes his achievement all the more remarkable is that he did this during 
the months of the crisis of spring 1918, as Allied armies reeled before the hammer 
blows of the German offensives. Those offensives were a catastrophe for the carrier 
pigeon service; many fixed and mobile lofts, and the birds they housed, had to be 
destroyed to prevent them falling into enemy hands. Not only did Waley salvage 
what he could and re-establish the pigeon service in time for the Allied counter-
offensives opening that July, but, working closely with his French comrades, he also 
established a pigeon-based liaison system between the high command of the two 
armies, in case the Germans should succeed in driving a wedge between them. Yet, 
by then, it was his messenger dog sections that looked to have more of a future. 
The (semi)mobile warfare of 1918 limited the utility of carrier pigeons. In the midst 
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of the defensive battles of the spring, Waley lamented, “during [a] rapid retreat 
in a few hours pigeons were useless.” Similarly, when BEF units were themselves 
advancing quickly in September, he noted that, in the hard-driving Canadian 
Corps, “an average of about 150 birds are being sent up daily to Brigades . . . and 
about 50 operations messages are coming in by pigeon . . . but owing to the rapid 
advance the distance for birds to fly back and the distance for the transmission of 
messages forward makes it extremely difficult for Divisions to receive messages 
early enough to be of any real use.”91 The dogs, however, were proving more and 
more useful and were becoming more widely accepted. On 11 June, as the BEF’s 
4th Army prepared for the coming counter-offensives, Waley recorded that in that 
formation “a fixed establishment of 30 dogs per Division has been arranged.”92
Their deployment was not without problems; both Waley and Richardson 
deplored Tommy’s habit of fussing over the dogs, distracting them while they were 
running. Waley, however, also notes instances of maltreatment. He and Richardson 
also had to work together to revise training methods; Richardson had been 
acclimatising dogs to the noise of gunfire and explosions in groups. Some who 
then found themselves running alone on the battlefield, without the comforting 
presence of their canine comrades, did not cope well.93 Overall, however, the dogs 
were a success and, throughout the summer and autumn months of 1918, Waley’s 
war diary records such comments as “reports from VIII Corps re Dogs are very 
satisfactory” and “Signals [in XIX Corps] are making good use of their dogs and 
Divisions in the line are asking for more.”94 Having proved the reliability of dogs 
in the messenger role, Waley was, by September, training dogs for a wider range 
of duties including liaison dogs, “carrier dogs” (both on the French model), and 
police dogs for the redcaps (military police) at Étaples.95  
The conventional, innovation-centric narratives of “the 100 Days” campaign 
that ended World War I stress mechanical and technological innovation: pigeons 
supplanted by wireless, cavalry supplanted by armour, infantry platoon and 
squad tactics based around automatic weapons, the precision and sophistication 
of artillery support, the employment of tactical airpower on the battlefield.96 
In contrast, the BEF’s increasing use of dogs has been entirely unheralded. The 
overall number of messenger dogs actually committed to action by the BEF is, it 
is true, difficult to estimate. Richardson cast his net widely, recruiting strays from 
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Battersea Dogs Home and similar institutions in Birmingham, Liverpool, Bristol, 
and Manchester. Yet he gave no precise numbers and, anyway, he was not the sole 
source of dogs. In early May 1918, Waley had discovered that one of his sergeants 
had adopted three local strays and was training them on his own initiative. Waley 
rather disapproved, but, by the end of the month, there was an official policy to 
round up similar strays at the base ports and, if they proved suitable, pass them to 
the kennels at Étaples for training.97 In total, the British probably never deployed 
more than a few hundred or so messenger dogs to the front line, far fewer than 
the French or Germans. Yet their presence would, in all likelihood, have become 
ubiquitous at battalion level if the war had continued into 1919, as, indeed, was 
stipulated in the BEF’s last instructions for divisional attacks, issued shortly before 
the armistice. As Richardson commented, “Like the Tank [the messenger dog] 
may be said to be particularly a product of this war.”98 The experience of warfare 
on the Western Front had finally convinced the British of what both their allies 
and enemies had already realised in 1914: there were important roles for dogs on 
modern battlefields. Warfare in the machine age called upon their muscles, sinew, 
and brains to an unprecedented degree. They serve our militaries to this day. 
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